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Article 2

TRUTH AS A COMPLETE DEFENCE IN AN
ACTION FOR LIBEL
By

J. Ross

HARINGTON

In the First Amendment to-the Federal Constitution we find
authority for the- proposition that "Congress shall make no law
--------------- abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
" Whereby the populace is guaranteed freedom
of speech and of the press by their own Constitution. But, at the
same time, it must not be forgotten that the above restriction is
merely placed upon the Federal Government and notthe individual governments of the separate states. The states, 'however,
have similar provisions in their individual constitutions placing a
like restriction upon their legislative function of government.
Now it cannot be denied that we.have the 'privilege' to speak
or print as we desire. But before proceeding we must. qualify
the precedent statement in that we have only that freedom of
speech that permits the truth to be uttered-matter that would
not be injurious to another person or persons, that which would
not be likely to cause disorder, riot, or insurrection, or that Which
might give scandal. As to scandal, that only can be prohibited
by a moral obligation in that we should not seek to -humiliate,
mortify, or bring disgrace.to our fellow-citizens. And today few
newspapers give little thought- to the scandalous news they print
being-in such haste to satisfy the desires of an axious "scandalmonging" public. This, however, we are not directly interested
in at the present writing.
Particularly interesting at this period when our country is so
rapidly making history, taking time neither to -look to the right
nor to the left, is the question of libel. - Little can we foresee in
that which we might utter today might be the basis for an action
of libel tomorrow. - At the present time there have been noticeably
few libel cases as in comparison with the 'number of similar actions appearing on the dockets a half t century or so arear. Business today is being carried on with greater rapidity, reliability,
and accuracy and reaching magnitudes that never were conceived
by the greatest of economic historians. But no matter how good

THE NOTRE- DAME LAWYER

we may be, we will always have evil among us. So also, there
will always be a certain degree of inaccuracy, unreliableness, and
untruths to combat.
People are in a hurry to work and in the same hurry to return
to their homes after their days work has been completed. Perchance they will pick up a newspaper, glance through its contents, perhaps reading the headlines, giving little attention to the
true meaning which the articles have to convey. Perhaps the
articles may be very detrimental and damaging to one who has
arisen to great heights, both locally and nationally. But to mean
anything to the average reader, the article must be outstanding,
probably must appear in bold type; it would have to be of singular importance in order to attract and hold their attention. And
if one item in particular had sufficient qualities, what-so-ever they
might be, to hold this 'reading' public interest, would it, to any
intelligible 'degree, discount the report-would it put unwarranted faith in the same, or would it cast the paper to one side
and say "bunk"?
It cannot be denied that some would make such a statement,
but there are many others that would take the contents of the said
article into thorough consideration, give it much thought which
might possibily cause the public not only to lose their absolute
faith in the person concerning whom the statement was printed,
but to evidentually deprive the person of his position. It is
against this latter class of citizens that the law protects the aggrevied and gives them a redress.
But a month ago, on occassion of debating the 'distinguished'
Jones Bill before its passage by the United States Congress, the
Honorable James Reed, in a very eloquent deliverance against
the passing df such deteriorating law, threatened to name a list
of the Congressmen who were temperate and in the same breath
not. No doubt if such a list ever had been delivered, it would
have been the leading scope of news to appear in publication that
day. And how many actions of libel would the Ex-senator
Reed have had to answer after the *publication. In his exposure,
Ex-senator Reed would have accused many nationally prominent
men of having committed felonies or misdemeanors, leaving himself open to an indictment for criminal libel, if his statement were
not true. But there can be no doubt that Mr. Reed would utter
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none other than the truth, and as we shall later see in this paper,
the truth of the defamatory charge is a complete defense in an
action of libel. Also, it must not be forgotten that the truth is
not always so easily proved.
At about the same time that Mr. Reed made his disturbing
threat, a busy reporter hurried about the Indiana Legislature
while it was in session and brought forth the "scope of news"
that an ample majority of the representatives, there making up
the assembly, voted dry and drank wet. But this inquiring reporter was very careful so as not to name the personages individually, who were so implicated. And we have not heard the last
of these reports as we are sooner or later to see brought forth
from a "little black box" a similar list which will reach publication. And it shall be particularly interesting to note what if any
libel actions that might! result from such a "defamation", if we
might so term it.
Probably the most interesting of libel actions to appear of
late in the Indiana courts is the case of George Dale, publisher of
a daily newspaper in Muncie, Indiana. In 1925 Dale published
in his paper, an article supposingly accusing one Warner of having escaped prosecution because of his alleged connection with
the Ku Klux Klan. This was during the height of the Klan
regime in Indiana during which time a criminal action of libel,
resultant of the publication, was brought against the Munce
publisher. He was tried and convicted under undeniable circumstances of prejudice. This case, however, was just recently reversed by the Supreme Court of Indiana, the prejudice of Judge
Dearth and the community at large being assigned as one of the
principal errors.
The question might be asked, just what is criminal libel.
Black, in his Law Dictionary, 2nd edition, sets out a very complete definition. "A libel is a malicious defamation, expressed
either by writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like,
tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach
the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. (Cases there cited.)
As for the definition of criminal libel see Burns Annotated Statutes Revised 1926, section 2437 wherein one is declared guilty of
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criminal libel for maliciously accusing one of having committed a
crime or degrading or infamous act.
With what we are primarilY' concerned in this paper, is the
truth of the statement or publication as being a complete defense
in an action for libel. Originally, at common law, the truth of
the defamatory matter was held not to be a complete defense in
an action for libel, the theory beink that the greater the truth, the
greater the liability. But such rule, at first blush, appears to
have no basis for its foundation. The-most probable reasoning
being that merely because the matter was true, it should not be
made public so as to deprive someone of his good character and
reputation. In 2 A. L. P. 207 it is stated that the operation of
the general law is quite harsh in cases where the plaintiff has reformed and for several years lead a law abiding and useful life.
On the other hand, in 36 C. J. 1231, it is stated that "at common law and, oftentimes, by force of constitutional or statutory
provisions,--the truth of a charge is a defense to a civil action
for defamation." This statement follows the law as enacted in
Indiana. Section 62, Burns Annotated Statutes revised, 1926,
states, "In all prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matter alleged to be libelous may be given in justification." And section
397 further mentions that "the defendant may allege the truth of
the matter charged as defamatory and mitigating circumstances
to reduce the damages ----------- etc." -From the above mentioned Statutes of the Indiana Code it is shown that the truth of
the defamatory matter charged to be libelous may be set up as a
defense in all prosecutions for libel, including both criminal and
civil. Indiana not only has stated her position on this point by
the enactments of statutes but there are to be found two exceptional opinions handed down by the Supreme Court.
The most distinguished case on record is that of Heilmanr v.
Shanklin et al, 60 Ind. 424. Prominent was this case, as it arose
during the Congressional election of 1878 when the plaintiff,
Heilman, was a candidate for Representative to the United
States Congress. The defendants in the case were owners and
publishers of the Evansville Daily Courier, in which newspaper
they caused to be published an article which accused the plaintiff
of running on a platform of beer and bribery. Heilman brought
an action of libel for damages stating the defendants had accused
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him of having committed a felony. If the statements published
were true, there could be no doubt that the plaintiff was guilty of
having committed the crimewith which he had been charged.
Wherefore the defendants pleaded in forty-two separate paragraphs -the truth of their accusation naming divers persons and
places where the plaintiff had bought beer and given money to
induce the participants and recepients thereof to vote for him.
Justice Hawk, in his able opinion, cited section 87 of the practice
act which was in identical wording to section 397 of Burns Annotated Statutes, Revised 1926 (supra). Said Justice Hawk, that
"in Folkard's Starkie on Slander and Libel, section 692, it is said,
that "The defenaant is, prima facie, justified in law, and exempt
from all civil responsibility, if that which he publishes be true."
In the same section it is further said: "When a plaintiff is really
guilty of the offence computed,, he does not offer himself to the
courts as a blameless party seeking a remedy for a malicious mischief; his original misbehavior taints the whole transaction with
which it is connected, and precludes him from recovering that
compensation to which an innocent person would be entitled."
In this quotation will be found the reason for the rule of law, that
the truth of the charge alleged to be libellous may be pleaded as
an absolute bar to an action for the recovery of damages therefor.
"In Townshend on Slander and Libel, section 212, page 362,
it is said: 'The justification must always be as broad as the
charge, and of the very charge attempted to be justified.------A justification on the ground of truth need not go further than
the charge, and it is sufficient to justify so much of the defamatory matter as is actionable, or so much as constitutes the sting
of the charge; it is unnecessary --------- to justify every word
of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if the substance
of the libellous charge be justified'." Thusly the Indiana Supreme Court summarizes tfie law in civil actions for libel when
the defense is the truth of the defamatory matter alleged as libellous.
In conformity with the above quoted law is the great weight
of authority. To refer once again to 36 C. J. 1231, we find that
'In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions to the
contrary, the general rule is that in all civil actions of libel ----the defendant is justified in law and exempt from all civil respon-
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sibility, where he alleges and establishes the truth of the matter
charged as defamatory, whether the words are actionable per se
or. per quod." ° See Courier Journal Co. v. Phillips, 134 S. W. 446,
142 Ky. 372, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 309; Merrey v. GuardianPrinting
and-PublishingCo., 74 A. 464, 79 N. J. Law. 177, Affirmed 80 A.
331, S1 N. J. -Law. 632; San Antonia Light "PublishingCo. v. Luvy,
113 S. W. 574, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 22; Qzdnn v. Review Publishing
Co., 104 Pac. 181., 55 Wash. 69, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1016, 19 Ann.
Cases 1077. "1
As to the truth being, a complete defense to a charge of libel
in a criminal prosecution, the same rule is applied as in civiJ actions for damages. See Heilnan v. Shanklin (supra). In State
v. Bush et al, 122 Ind. 43, 23 N. E. 677, a criminal prosecution was
brought by the state of Indiana against Bush et al, .editors of a
newspaper in which the alleged libellous publication was made.
The court in its brief and concise decision stated that "If the
words published, were, in fact, true, whether published in good
faith or not; the appellees were not guilty of the crime charged.'!
Mosier r,.
State, 119 Ind. 244. Indiana not only declares emphatically that-the truth of the defamatory matter charged to be libellous is a complete defense, but that it matters not with what motive the publication be made, whether it be good or 1ad, the
requisite being that the defamatory statement be true. In accord
with Indiana see Sullings v, Shakespeare, 46 Mich. 408, 41 Am.
Rep. 166, 9 N. W. 451; also, 2 A. L P. 207.
Only with the rule of law as above quotated would an individual have the courage to publish any defamatory matter, no
matter how true the publication might be. This is especially
true today as there are many incidents that the public should be
informed of. Daily the public is placing more confidence in a
smaller group and intrusting this group with duties which formerly they, themselves, performed. Because of this confidence being placed within a few individuals, no matter how libellous the
1 For an extended note and citations following the general rule that the
truth of the defamatory matter Is a complete defense in a civil action for
libel, see 31 L. R. A. (N. 9.) 132. Also, 36 C. J. 1231, section 193; watersPnere Ooil Co. v. Bridvwell. 155 S. W. 126, 107 Ark. 310; La Monte" v. Shinn,
150 N. WV. 864, 168 Iowa. 531; Kirkpatrick v. Journal Publishing Co., 97 So.
Airror Co., 195 Pac. 666. 185 Calif. 20;
58, 210 Ala. 10; Chavig v. Times-M
.lcIntosh v. Williams. 128 S. E. 672. 160 Ga. 461; Phillips v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 238 S. W. 127 (Mo.); Grand Union Tea Co. v. Lord, 231 Fed. 300.
which state that the truth is not a complete de.
There is .a minority i'il(
fen-e unless the deffatr.tory matter constituting the libel be publishedii
good faith witi, a gw 0 motive.
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defamatory publication may be, if it be true, and for the enlightment of the "settlors" as to the performance of their "trustees" it
should be published and set before them in order to prevent a
reoccurrence of the same act. And exposure can be assured only
when the utterer has certain proof of exemption from liability in
an action of libel. And at the same time it must not be forgotten
that only the truth shQuld be uttered.

